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contractual arrangement used in the Chinese mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 
market. The “two-direction payment” design of Chinese VAMs can reduce deal 
uncertainty and generate value, especially for poorly performing companies that can 
use VAM contracts to boost short-term performance. I find in this empirical 
investigation that acquirers applying VAM terms have significantly higher market 
returns after addressing endogeneity. I also document that poorly performing bidders 
sign larger VAM contracts, pay higher bid premiums and achieve higher operating 
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Takeovers of privately held firms represent the vast majority of transactions 
worldwide (Chang 1998; Draper & Paudyal 2006), and acquirers earn significant 
positive returns when acquiring a privately held company, especially when the method 
of payment is stock (Fuller et al. 2002). Positive market reactions are due mainly to 
either the stronger bargaining power of acquirers (a privately held target is typically 
illiquid) or closely monitor by target block holders (Shleifer & Vishny 1986). 
However, properly evaluating privately held targets and setting the transaction price is 
a difficult undertaking (regardless of whether cash or shares are used as the method of 
payment), because available information on a private target is rare. Moreover, target 
firms also face uncertainty in relation to acquirer-specific information revelations 
(acquirer sigma), especially when the acquirers are small (Alexakis & Barbopoulos 
2020).  
To complement the due diligence process, acquiring firms can use a mixed 
method of payment (Chang 1998; Fuller et al. 2002), thus mitigating transaction risks 
due to information asymmetry. In addition, the multi-stage contingent payment 
mechanism (the “earnout” provision) is also widely used in takeover transactions in 
the US and UK markets, while in the Chinese mergers and acquisitions (hereafter, 
M&As) market, a similar arrangement, namely the valuation adjustment mechanism1 
(VAM), is used in the contractual arrangement of transactions. The Chinese VAM is a 
contractual agreement made between acquirers and target shareholders through which 
 
1 In Chinese “对赌协议” 
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the former can give additional rewards to target firm sellers2 when the target meets 
predetermined goals; otherwise, target firm sellers are punished by repaying part of 
the deal value back to the acquiring firm (in the form of cash or a combination of cash 
and equity). The reason for setting up this contingent payment is to solve information 
asymmetry issues in the acquisition process, especially for a private target, which has 
less information transparency and a considerably higher degree of valuation risk. In 
addition to this information asymmetry, the other role of a VAM in contract design is 
the “signal” effect. Only good-quality targets (or at least targets with good short-term 
prospects) have the confidence to sign a VAM contract with acquirers, as target sellers 
are punished upon losing additional cash payments already received by the target 
firm’s seller from the acquiring firm. Thus, the VAM serves as a reliable “guaranteed 
signal” of profit improvements after an acquisition transaction, and this “quality 
guarantee” is especially important to poorly performing acquirers at risk of delisting3 
from the stock market, and it reduces acquisition uncertainty, thereby sending stronger 
positive signals to the financial market. 
Existing empirical studies such as (Lyon et al. 1999; Phalippou et al. 2014) 
show that M&As may not create value for shareholders, with one of main causes 
being the improper valuation of targets and overpayment, due to information 
asymmetries between acquirers and targets – especially when targets are private firms 
 
2 Target firm sellers are the original owners of targets. After they have sold a portion of their 
shares to acquirers, target firms remain as an independent firms of the acquirers. Sellers of 
targets are still shareholders of target firms and remain on the key managerial team of the 
target. 
3 According to CSRC regulations, when a firm consistently has three years of negative profits, 
it can be listed on the mainland stock market. Before being delisted, the stock name is 
changed to “ST+StockName.” ST refers to special treatment.  
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operating in high-tech or R&D-intensive industries. To mitigate this risk, acquiring 
firms can choose to engage in thorough due diligence and use a mixed method of 
payment (Fuller et al. 2002) or a multi-stage contingent payment (Alexakis & 
Barbopoulos 2020) to reduce uncertainty in the transaction, thereby protecting 
acquiring shareholders’ interests, creating shareholder value (Barbopoulos et al. 
2018b) and reducing future goodwill impairments (Cadman et al. 2014). The present 
research focuses on the Chinese M&A market, in which acquirers widely adopt this 
contract design in acquisition transactions, and I examine the roles and potential 
consequences of acquisition deals that adopt VAMs in transactions.  
The VAM in the Chinese acquisition market displays a number of similarities to 
the “earnout” provision of the developed financial market, as they both include some 
portion of payment that is contingent upon predetermined performance (e.g. net 
profits), and this contingent payment can reduce information asymmetries for both 
bidding and target shareholders facing valuation risks when negotiating transaction 
prices (Barbopoulos & Sudarsanam 2012). However, VAMs in China offer several 
unique characteristics relative to an earnout in the developed market, including 
stronger signals to the capital market, higher incentives to target managerial teams 
and a great reduction in uncertainty by paying a higher premium. I elaborate on the 
details in the following section. 
First, an earnout is used as a payment currency in a transaction, especially for 
financially constrained acquirers (Bates et al. 2018), whereby the target seller receives 
a second-stage payment contingent on the future performance of the target. Under 
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existing earnout arrangements, when a target cannot deliver the predetermined level 
of performance, nothing is lost. However, the VAM in China is a separate contract 
signed between acquirers and targets in addition to the negotiated prices of the 
transaction, and it serves as a “two-direction-payment” mechanism: under the VAM 
contract, when the target cannot deliver the promised level of performance (e.g., net 
profits), the seller has to repay part of the deal value back to the acquiring firm. On 
the other hand, the seller might also negotiate an additional bonus payment if 
performance targets are met. For example, a Shenzhen Stock Exchange-listed 
company (stock code: 300188) made an acquisition announcement on 08 August 2013 
and signed a VAM contract with a seller. In the contract, both the bidder and the seller 
agreed a promised net profits target of 35.56 million RMB. If the target company 
were unable to meet the promised net profit target, the seller agreed that they would 
repay the difference between the promised and the realised (actual) net profits back to 
the acquirer. However, if the target company did indeed meet the promised target, the 
additional 20% * (difference between realised net profits and promised net profits) 
would be paid to the seller by the acquirer as an additional bonus. This potential 
punishment/bonus ensures that target sellers have strong incentives to deliver the 
promised level of performance (net profits), and it sends a strong signal to the 
financial market (signaling hypothesis). These strong incentives to deliver promised 
profits are particularly valuable to Chinese acquirers with past poor performance, as 




Second, information asymmetry can lead to adverse selection, in that the buyer 
offers too low a price due to valuation risks. Thus, good-quality sellers exit the M&A 
market while poor-quality companies of questionable value remain (Lukas & 
Heimann 2014). Earnout payments attempt to reconcile the different expectations of 
sellers and buyers in an acquisition, and they can be used to partially reduce the 
“adverse selection” problem caused by information asymmetry, because determining 
an appropriate initial-stage payment in earnout is still difficult. However, a VAM 
contract in China can provide additional rewards or punishments for target 
shareholders, and the potential additional payments to and from the target firms 
depend on the difference between realised profits and promised profits. This 
“two-directional” design ensures a fair deal transaction value for both acquirers and 
targets, greatly mitigates the “adverse selection” problem and ensures target quality in 
the acquisition market. 
Third, Kohers and Ang (2000) show that even when private target owners in an 
earnout-financed deal do not receive a deferred payment, they still receive an initial 
payment that is higher than the full deal payment through a non-earnout-financed deal 
(Barbopoulos & Sudarsanam 2012). Barbopoulos and Adra (2016) document that 
target owners are incentivised to exaggerate information asymmetries and aim to 
motivate the inclusion of an earnout as a payment currency, meaning that owners 
receive an initial payment that exceeds the full payment that they would otherwise 
have received had the earnout not been included in the deal’s financing process 
(Barbopoulos & Adra 2016). The effort involved in negotiating an extreme high 
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first-stage payment without working hard to deliver the promised profits in later stage 
is called a “moral hazard”. While the Chinese VAM is not part of a payment currency 
in an acquisition transaction, it nevertheless serves as an additional contract term to 
align the interests of acquirers and targets, and the full payment made upon the 
announcement of the deal and the later payback mechanism – if the target cannot 
deliver the promised profits – can effectively solve the “moral hazard” issue of high 
first-stage payment problems associated with earnout payments. 
Finally, both the VAM and earnouts are used to reduce information asymmetries, 
especially for private target acquisitions, for which detailed information on targets is 
not publicly available on the market. Moreover, earnout deals outperform non-earnout 
deals when both initial and deferred payments are in stocks (Barbopoulos et al. 
2018b). Conversely, in the Chinese M&A market, acquirers like to use full cash 
payments (Boateng & Bi 2014), and the majority of acquisition targets are private. 
This unique M&A market setting reduces the potential contaminating effects of using 
stock as a payment currency in public acquisition deals. Examining the Chinese 
market and VAM contracts creates a clean market setting in which to scrutinise the 
role of contingent payments in transactions. 
Due to the unique characteristics of the VAM arrangement in the Chinese M&A 
market, acquisition transactions with VAM agreements not only provide liquidity4 to 
these private target sellers, but they also – more importantly – ensure good-quality 
 
4 Listing on the Chinese mainland market is difficult and time-consuming; an alternative way 




targets, especially to poorly performing acquirers who are under pressure to improve 
their performance in the short term.  
Using 1,023 privately-held-target acquisition deals made from 2009 to 2014, I 
find that acquisitions with a VAM contract generate significantly more value than 
deals not using a VAM. This positive effect remains significant after I apply two 
approaches in our empirical investigations to address endogeneity: Heckman’s (1979) 
method to control for “self-selection bias,” and propensity-score matching (PSM) to 
address “sample selection bias” based on observable firm characteristics. I show that 
the positive value-creation effect of a VAM is more pronounced for poorly performing 
acquirers prior to an acquisition announcement, thereby suggesting that the VAM 
benefits acquirers more in delisting risk, while its role as a “signal of guarantee” is 
used by investors as an effective means to save a “poorly performing” firm by 
launching an acquisition deal.  
I also explore potential sources of short-term positive market reactions, with my 
results showing that acquisitions incorporating a VAM can significantly improve 
post-event operating performance, especially for poorly performing bidders. These 
results are consistent with those observed in cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
regressions, and they suggest that VAM contracts are able to increase shareholder 
value. I also investigate the size of VAM contracts further and find that poorly 
performing bidders tend to sign larger VAM contracts with target firms, which further 
supports the arguments that poor bidders are eager to use VAM contracts to boost their 
short-term performance. In addition, I document that poorly performing bidders pay 
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much higher premiums to target firms. 
Regarding the likelihood of adopting a VAM in a Chinese M&A transaction, I 
document that acquirers without pre-event holdings in target firms, and in complex 
transaction deals, are more likely to use a VAM as an additional contract design in a 
transaction. I also conduct a robustness test by applying a buy-and-hold-abnormal 
return and an alternative model to calculate short-term abnormal returns; in addition, I 
use different “poorly performing firm” proxies. I confirm that my results are robust in 
relation to model specification and variable measurement biases. 
This paper contributes in several ways to the limited empirical evidence 
regarding the effects of contingent payments on firms’ investment decisions. First, I 
provide an updated analysis of the role of contract design in corporate acquisition 
decisions made in the Chinese market, in which VAMs are widely used as a contract 
term and are not part of the payment currency, unlike in the US market. The 
“two-direction payment” mechanism seen in Chinese VAM samples enables me to 
conduct meaningful comparative studies on the effectiveness of contingent payments 
made in transactions. Second, I document that VAMs can increase deal values and that 
this value-creation role is more pronounced for poorly performing acquirers prior to 
an event, due to the strong value-creating “signal of a guarantee” effect, thereby 
supporting empirical studies on earnouts in the US market – according to which the 
contingent payment can reduce information asymmetries by mitigating valuation risks. 
However, my research shows that the contract design of the VAM in Chinese 
acquisitions can significantly reduce future profit uncertainty for acquiring firms, 
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which, in turn, significantly increases the market value of these acquiring firms. Third, 
unlike previous studies focusing on listed public target firms, my empirical evidence 
shows that poorly performing bidders adopting VAM terms in their transactions can 
significantly improve acquirers’ long-term operating performance, albeit the empirical 
evidence shows that these acquisitions with VAMs significantly increase bid 
premiums, as acquirers may rely heavily on promised profits from targets rather than 
make an effort to boost current business operations. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the institutional 
background and a literature review. Section 3 discusses the data and variables, and 
section 4 presents empirical evidence on the impacts of a VAM on acquisition 
performance. Finally, section 5 reports the robustness test, and section 6 presents the 
study’s conclusions. 
 
2. Literature Review and Institutional Background  
 
2.1 Earnout literature review  
This paper is related to several strands of the contingent payment literature. 
Most notably, it is related to earnout payment studies of the US M&As market that 
focus on why earnout payments reduce information asymmetries in transactions. 
“Information asymmetry” refers to the uncertainty involved in target valuation, due to 
the limited amount of available information regarding these targets. Meanwhile, the 
medium of exchange in M&As has been widely documented in empirical studies, in 
order to address information asymmetries. For example, Fishman (1989) and Eckbo et 
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al. (1990) argue that all-cash offers mitigate the mispricing of bidders arising from the 
bidder’s information asymmetry, while a stock offer can help a bidder address 
overpayment risk arising from the target’s information asymmetry. A mixed payment 
of cash and stock offers can only partially solve the information asymmetry arising 
from the bidder and the target. In addition to using a method of payment to mitigate 
the target valuation risk, a multi-stage contingent payment mechanism (earnout) is 
also widely used in the transaction (Barbopoulos & Sudarsanam 2012; Barbopoulos & 
Adra 2016; Alexakis & Barbopoulos 2020), especially in cross-border deals 
announced by acquirers that have no prior international business experience 
(Barbopoulos et al. 2018a). Finnerty et al. (2012) contend that an earnout contract can 
be treated as two separate components: debt and equity. The debt component enables 
a target to reduce the bidder’s information asymmetry, while the equity component 
enables an acquirer to reduce the target’s information asymmetry. The combination of 
these two components is preferred in deals when acquirers and targets present larger 
levels of information asymmetry. Empirical evidence (Finnerty et al. 2012; 
Barbopoulos & Adra 2016) also shows that earnout contracts generate significantly 
more value to shareholders; however, the earnout effect is potentially elusive, due to 
the presence of an acquirer-specific information revelation effect (high sigma 
acquirers), especially for small acquirers that have severe information asymmetry 
between firm managers and outside investors (Alexakis & Barbopoulos 2020). 
Furthermore, the potential benefits of earnout contracts could also turn out to be 
empty promises in countries without effective legal protection for earnout holders 
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(Viarengo et al. 2018). 
The second strand of the literature examines the impact of earnout structures. 
For example, from 424 UK deals made between 1996 and 2010, Barbopoulos and 
Adra (2016) show that the structure of earnouts is significantly related to the deal 
premium of a transaction. More specifically, an additional 10% increase in earnout 
size is associated with a 6.45% higher deal premium, while the negative association 
between high premiums and low announcement period returns is neutralised in 
earnout-financed deals. This empirical result is consistent with the prediction made by 
Lukas et al. (2012) that higher premiums are allocated to target firms to compensate 
for sharing risk after a transaction. In terms of the length of earnout periods, Lukas 
and Heimann (2014) document that earnout periods are again negatively related to the 
bidding premium, as a longer earnout contract period will again force targets to share 
business risk with acquirers.  
Finally, empirical studies extend contingent payment to private-equity (PE) 
investments by analysing the relationship between contract design and returns for PE 
investments. Cumming (2008) was the first to examine thoroughly the association 
between contract design and investment performance, while more recently, Caselli et 
al. (2013) examined 834 PE investment deals made in the EU and empirically 
demonstrated that a rich contract design generates more value for investors, as it 
incentivises managers to work on profit maximisation and serves as a “guarantee” to 
PE investors. 
However, no empirical studies have examined the role and effectiveness of 
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“two-direction” contingent payments made in Chinese acquisition deals in which this 
“two-direction” mechanism has a considerably stronger signal effect. The present 
paper links the VAM contract to acquisition deal outcomes and contends that the 
VAM is able to add value for acquirers, especially for poorly performing firms. 
 
2.2 M&As and VAM in China  
There has been an explosion in the growth of the Chinese M&As market in 
recent years. According to the Zero2IPO database5, 2,692 deals were made in 2015, 
reflecting a 39.6% increase relative to 2014 values, and the value of deals has risen by 
44% on an annual basis. Among these deals, 89.4% are domestic an equate to 81.4 
billion RMB, reflecting a 63.7% increase relative to 2014. Of these domestic deals, 
Internet industries account for the largest number. Data from the CSRC show that 
China is now home to the world’s second largest M&As market. 
The VAM is a contract signed between acquirers and target shareholders, the 
purpose of which is to protect shareholders’ interests and to reduce information 
asymmetries between bidders and targets. The first successful VAM contract created 
in China was signed by Morgan Stanley and MengNiu Group in 2003, in which 
MengNiu agreed on an annual sales growth rate of 50% for the next three years. Due 
to their capacities to mitigate transaction risk, VAM contracts have become popular 
tools in Chinese M&As deals ever since.  






equity (PE) industry in China, as PE in good-quality, privately held firms chooses 
either an IPO or a takeover as the cash-out channel, and thus the contingent payment 
arrangement (VAM) in the takeover process is very similar to the contractual 
arrangement in the PE investment contract in the Chinese financial market. A typical 
VAM contract will involve both the acquirer and the target discussing and agreeing a 
predetermined performance target (e.g. net profit) before the transaction, and if this 
target is not met, a certain amount of cash must be paid back to the acquiring firm. 
The amount of payback is equal to the difference between the agreed performance 
target in the contract and the actual realised performance over the evaluation period. 
Thus, the payback amount varies according to each deal. Acquirers and targets can 
also negotiate a cash bonus when the latter meet the predetermined performance target, 
but a cash bonus6 does not equate to the payback amount when the target fails to 
meet the performance metric, because the payback amount generally equates to the 
difference between a predetermined figure and the actual outcome. 
 
3. Data and Variables 
 
In this section I discuss my samples, the main variables and the characteristics 
of my samples. I also present a univariate test that compares deal characteristics, 
classified as VAM-contract acquisition and non-VAM contract acquisition.  
3.1 Sample Construction 
My sample of 1,023 Chinese domestic M&As deals was selected from the 
 
6 A cash bonus is generally a certain percentage (20%-50%) of additional profits above the 
promised performance target. 
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GTA Corporate Restructure and Acquisition database for 2009 through 2014, as VAM 
contract information is available from 2009, and I also require two years’ post-event 
financial and stock market return data available for my sample acquirers (by the end 
of 2016). I used the following criteria to select my final M&A sample: (1) transaction 
types, including mergers, tender offers and acquisitions of major assets; (2) acquirers, 
including domestic Chinese listed companies, with targets being domestic Chinese 
non-listed firms; (3) deal values representing at least 1% of the acquirer’s level of 
market capitalisation; (4) related-party transactions (financial and utility sectors are 
excluded, due to the use of different financial reporting methods); (5) I exclude 
observations of multiple deals announced for the same firm over a one-year period, to 
reduce contamination effects; (6) firm-level financial and accounting data are selected 
from the CSMAR database and (7) no restriction on the percentage of shares bought, 
in order to maintain a larger available sample size7. 
【Table 1】 
 
Panel A of Table 1 presents a sample industry distribution for the 1,023 
acquisition observations. My samples cover all major CSRC industries, excluding 
financial and utilities firms. The manufacturing industry presents the largest number 
of deals (63.83%), followed by the IT (9.78%) and real estate industries (7.72%). 
Acquisitions in the IT industry grew dramatically, due to the importance of IT 
technologies for various sectors. My sample industry distribution is very similar to 
 
7 Baseline regressions, using a sub-sample of deals where the bidder owns less than 50% 
before the transaction and more than 50% thereafter, remain the same. The results are not 
reported in this paper, but they are available upon request. 
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that reported by (Deng et al. 2013) for the US market, who found that 57.19% of US 
acquirers operate in the manufacturing sector. Table 1 also presents the industry 
distribution for the 225 VAM samples, and the manufacturing industry still represents 
the largest number of deals (66.22%). The number of VAM deals made in the IT 
industry increased dramatically to 20%. Panel B shows the year of distribution for 
takeover deals, with a clear trend showing that more takeover deals adopted VAM 
contract terms. 
 
3.2 Measurement of Key Variables 
The main variable of interest is a dummy variable equal to 1 when acquirers 
adopt a VAM in a transaction; otherwise, it is equal to 0. As no database currently 
covers contract terms made between acquirers and targets, I manually collected VAM 
terms from company acquisition reports published by acquirers via the CSRC8. As 
illustrated in Table 1, the number of takeover deals adopting VAM terms increased 
significantly by the end of 2014. On average, approximately 22% of my sample uses 
VAM terms in transactions, and proportions of M&As using VAM terms in China are 
considerably larger than those reported in empirical studies by (Datar et al. 2001; 
Cain et al. 2011; Ewelt-Knauer et al. 2011)9. 
To determine whether adopting VAM contract terms can improve shareholder 
value through acquisitions, I examine whether acquisition deals with VAM terms 
affect capital market responses to announcements, as measured by cumulative 
 
8 CSRC: China Securities Regulatory Commission. 
9 These studies report that, on average, 3.1%-6.8% of deals adopt earnouts in transactions.  
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abnormal returns (CARs) over various event windows. I apply a standard event study 
methodology based on a standard market model benchmark, with market returns 
provided by the Shanghai Composite Index. Specifically, the market model calculates 
the abnormal return ARit for firm i on day t as 
              ARit = Rit – (αi + βi Rmt)                           (1) 
 
where Rit is returns for firm i on day t, and αi and βi are firm-specific regression 
parameters estimated over the 250-day period, i.e. event day -310 to event day -61. I 
focus on various event windows, and the event day is designated as the date of the 
announcement of an acquisition deal. 
An alternative means of calculating CARs involves using a market-adjusted 
model over a market model, as documented in (Dimson 1979; Dimson & Marsh 1983). 
For brevity, I only report results based on the market model, but CAR results based on 
the market-adjusted model still hold for all of my regression analyses. 
 
3.3 Sample Statistics 
Table 2 presents summary statistics on key acquiring firm characteristics. 
Detailed definitions of the variables are given in the Appendix. All continuous 
variables are winsorised at their 1st and 99th percentiles to limit the influence of 
outliers. My results show that acquiring firms’ CARs over two different observation 
periods and the mean CARs for acquiring firms fall within 1.7% and 3.1%, while the 
median CARs for acquiring firms range from 0.1% to 0.7%. These CAR distributions 
are very similar to those reported in Bi and Wang (2018), who also find that Chinese 
acquisitions generate significantly positive value for shareholders. The average 
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market capitalisation of acquirers is 5.8 billion Yuan, and the average leverage ratio 
for acquiring firms is 0.338. My sample’s acquirers also have mean cash holdings of 
22.3%, which supports Boateng and Bi (2014) argument that most Chinese acquiring 
firms are cash-rich. In this sample, the acquirers’ average Tobin’s Q ratio is 2.06, the 
book-to-market ratio 0.59 and the price run-up (measured from a pre-event 12-month 
BHAR) 8.1%. In terms of operating performance measures, my sample’s acquiring 
firms present a higher industry median-adjusted ROA that is 1.7% higher than the 
industry median value. The acquirers’ Tobin’s Q ratio is similar to that reported by 
Schmidt (2015), but it has a higher leverage ratio than that of US acquirers. The 
average relative value of the deals is 11.9% of acquirer assets, indicating that the 
acquisitions considered in my study are non-trivial investments. I also measure 
acquiring firms’ idiosyncratic stock return volatility (sigma), with an average value of 
0.03. Regarding the proxies for corporate governance, 17.1% of my acquirers have 
managerial holdings, and 36.9% of board members are independent directors. The 
controlling shareholders of the sample’s acquirers hold more than 50.13% of 
outstanding shares, thus revealing the very concentrated ownership structure typical 
of Chinese capital markets. 
【Table 2】 
 
3.4 Univariate test 
Table 3 presents a univariate test of key acquiring firm characteristics based on 
the presence of VAM contract terms in M&As deals. I observe that firms in the two 
subgroups have different firm characteristics. Table 3 demonstrates that acquiring 
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firms with VAM terms are larger, have higher price run-up values and a higher 
Tobin’s Q ratio and are less likely to pay in cash than firms with non-VAM contracts. 
Moreover, there is no significant difference between cash holdings and pre-event 
operating performance. In addition, average market reactions around announcements 
(CARs) are positive for both subsamples, while the VAM subsample experiences 
significantly higher short-term market reactions than the non-VAM subsample. 
Collectively, these univariate results suggest that markets react positively to acquirers 
who adopt VAM terms in transactions. 
【Table 3】 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
 
4.1 Announcement Effect 
If adopting VAM contract terms can generate more value for acquisition deals 
than a non-VAM contract deal, I expect such firms to make better acquisitions and to 
receive stronger market reactions in relation to these events. In the following section, 
I examine whether a VAM generates better acquisition deals, by presenting estimates 
from multivariate regressions using CAR(-1/1) as the dependent variable, and the 
dummy variable VAM as a key independent variable. The regression of acquisition 
returns controls for determinants of acquirers’ performance illustrated in previous 
studies (Huang et al. 2014; Phalippou et al. 2014; Bi & Wang 2018). Specifically, 
ROA measures pre-event accounting performance (Harford 1999), and the pre-event 
price run up measures stock price performance. I also use Cash Holding to control for 
the agency costs of free cash flows (Jensen 1986), Book-to-market Ratio to control for 
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investment opportunities (Officer 2003) and sigma to control for the acquirer-specific 
information revelation effect (Alexakis & Barbopoulos 2020). Other firm and deal 
characteristics include firm size, leverage, the Tobin’s Q ratio and the method of 
payment. In addition to including common control variables used in the M&As 
literature, I consider corporate governance variables available to the Chinese market 
in regressions, including CEO duality, managerial holding, independent directors and 
the share concentration ratio (Boateng & Bi 2014). The regressions also control for 
industry and year fixed effects. I use the following multivariate regression: 
    𝐶𝐴𝑅(−1,1),𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑉𝐴𝑀𝑖 + 𝛾1𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝛾2𝐶𝐺𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖      (2) 
 
where dependent variable 𝐶𝐴𝑅(−1,1)𝑖  is the announcement cumulative abnormal 
return calculated from the market model in the (-1,1) event window for firm i. The 
main variable of interest is 𝑉𝐴𝑀i, a dummy variable equal to one when a deal adopts 
a VAM term in a transaction, and otherwise equal to zero. 
【Table 4】 
 
The results are reported in Table 4. Column 1 presents estimates of the VAM 
coefficient without control variables. The coefficient is 0.055 and is significantly 
positive at the 1% level. This result suggests that the average CAR for acquiring firms 
that adopt a VAM term is 5.5% higher than the average CAR for acquiring firms that 
do not adopt such a term. Column 2 illustrates estimates made after controlling for the 
determinants of acquirer announcement returns identified in previous studies, and 
these control variables include the acquirer’s size, the leverage ratio, the acquirer’s 
cash holdings prior to the event, the acquirer’s Tobin’s Q ratio, the book-to-market 
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ratio, the percentage share held after the transaction, sigma and the acquirer’s 
pre-event performance. In addition, I include additional corporate governance 
variables for the Chinese market, including the percentage of managerial holdings, 
CEO duality and the percentage of independent directors (Boateng & Bi 2014). I find 
that coefficient estimates for the VAM term are reduced to 0.024, but it remains 
positive and significant at the 1% level. Thus, even after controlling for various firm- 
and deal-specific characteristics, acquisition deals with VAM terms generate higher 
returns than deals that do not use them. Table 4 provides strong evidence in support of 
the notion that VAM contract terms create value for shareholders.  
The announcement of CARs is also significantly related to certain firm- and 
deal-specific characteristics. Consistent with previous findings, such as those 
presented by (Faccio et al. 2006), there is a significantly negative relationship 
between acquirer CARs and acquirer size. In my sample, acquirer CARs are also 
negatively related to the cash-payment dummy and are positively related to the 
relative value of deals.  
 
4.2 Identification Concerns 
In this section, I address concerns regarding endogeneity. Following (Fich et 
al. 2013), I correct omitted variable bias by including a year and an industry dummy 
in all baseline regressions, because industry and/or time trends could affect the 
incidence of takeovers and the decision to adopt a VAM contract, in order to reduce 
uncertainty. 
I additionally adopt two approaches to address endogeneity in the empirical 
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investigations: the Heckman (1979) method, to control for “self-selection bias,” and 
propensity-score matching (PSM), to address sample selection bias based on 
observable firm characteristics.     
I first consider the endogeneity of bidder-VAM matching arising from the 
decision to use a VAM being correlated with certain unobserved firm- or deal-specific 
characteristics, as a VAM contract may be preferred by a specific type of acquirer, 
thereby potentially rendering OLS estimates biased. To address this concern, I follow 
methods presented by (Heckman 1979; Golubov et al. 2012) to control for this 
potential “self-selection bias.” Heckman (1979) argues that self-selection bias is 
similar in nature to a specification error (omitted variable bias) and proposes a 
two-stage procedure for controlling it. I apply this procedure where the first-stage 
equation models the selection of a VAM contract in the acquisition period while the 
second-stage equation corrects for the selection bias10. Following Li and Prabhala 
(2007), this instrumental variable should affect the decision to adopt a VAM contract, 
but it should not directly affect the outcomes of current acquisition deals. In the spirit 
of Fang (2005) and Golubov et al. (2012), I use “scope” to serve as such an 
identification restriction. “Scope” measures the extent to which acquirers use a VAM 
contract prior to an IPO. In this paper, the scope variable takes a value of one, once an 
acquirer has signed a VAM contract with a private-equity investor before being listed 
on the stock market, and a value of zero otherwise.  
Table 5 presents the results of this analysis. The scope variable is highly 
significant (at the 1% level) in determining the choice to use a VAM contract in the 
acquisition period. This means that the extent to which acquirers use a VAM contract 
before an IPO is positively related to the decision to sign one with a target, again 
 




during the acquisition period. The probability of using a VAM contract is also 
positively related to the acquirer’s percentage of managerial holdings, while the 
decision to use one is negatively related to the acquirer’s degree of leverage, the 
book-to-market ratio and the method of payment. The pseudo-R sqr of the first stage 
indicates that the model explains up to 37.7% of the decision to use a VAM contract.  
【Table 5】 
 
From the first-stage equation I construct, I add an inverse mills ratio as an 
additional regressor to the second-stage equation. As highlighted in Table 5, this 
selection term is insignificant at conventional levels, thereby indicating that the 
coefficient estimates of the baseline regressions (Table 4) are reliable. In other words, 
unobserved characteristics that affect the likelihood of using a VAM contract do not 
have significant effects on M&A outcomes. Thus, I can conclude that the use of a 
VAM contract is associated with higher announcement returns.  
My second means of addressing endogeneity issues involves using the 
propensity score-matching method, which can correct for sample selection biases 
resulting from observable differences between a treatment and a control group 
(Dehejia & Wahba 2002). I compare the mean CARs of portfolios of deals for which 
VAM contracts were used with control groups not using VAM contracts. The control 
deal is identified using the propensity score matching (PSM) process. I first build a 
propensity score model, using a logit model that estimates the use of VAM contracts 
during acquisition with a dependent variable equal to one when a VAM contract is 
present, and equal to zero otherwise. The independent variables include firm size, 
leverage, cash-holding, Tobin’s Q ratio, the book-to-market ratio, sigma, the price 
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run-up and pre-event operating performance. I then apply 1-to-1 nearest neighbour 
matching without replacement and select the non-VAM deal with the propensity score 
closest to the VAM deal. The sensitivity of the conclusion to the potential unobserved 
covariate from each propensity score estimator is examined through the Rosenbaum 
bounds method (Rosenbaum 2009; Alexakis & Barbopoulos 2020). 
【Table 6】 
     The selection model estimation is reported in Panel A of Table 6. Acquirers with 
a superior pre-event operating performance and a stronger pre-event stock market 
performance are more likely to sign VAM contracts with target firms; meanwhile, 
acquirers with a larger sigma also significantly increase the likelihood of using a 
VAM contract. In Panel B of Table 6, I report the statistical difference of covariates 
between the treated and control samples, whereby all variables are test insignificant, 
thereby confirming successful matching sequences. In Panel C of Table 6, I report the 
mean difference in CARs observed between the treatment and control samples. As 
reported in Table 3, the treatment samples have average CARs ranging from 6.5% to 
7.4% over two different event windows, while the control samples’ CARs are around 
2.7% over the same event windows and the difference between these two groups is 
test significant. The results remain consistent when using a market index-adjusted 
model to calculate CARs. The results derived from the PSM method therefore confirm 
the results of the univariate analysis shown in Table 3 and those from the multiple 
regression analysis shown in Table 4. Overall, these findings reveal higher abnormal 
acquirer returns when a VAM is used during an acquisition. Finally, the Rosenbaum 
bounds test is reported in Panel D of Table 6, where gamma represents how influential 
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an unobserved covariate needs to be in order to invalidate the treatment effect on a 
random variable (Alexakis & Barbopoulos 2020). 
 
4.3 Poorly performing bidders and short-term returns 
The results provided in Table 4 suggest that a VAM term does add value for 
shareholders. However, VAM contracts do not mitigate information asymmetry issues 
solely, as another role of a VAM in a contract’s design is rooted in its “signal” effect. 
Only high-quality targets have the confidence to sign VAM contracts with acquirers, 
as sellers of targets are punished upon losing additional cash payments already 
received by sellers of target firms from acquiring firms. Thus, a VAM serves as a 
reliable “guarantee” of good performance after a transaction, and I expect this 
additional “guarantee” to send a strong message to the capital market regarding the 
opportunities for value creation from this transaction. This “quality guarantee” is 
especially important for poorly performing acquirers at risk of delisting11 from the 
stock market, and an acquisition with the VAM term constitutes the easiest and fastest 
way to improve performance in the near future. Thus, I expect to find that reducing 




I perform the CAR regression as in equation (2) by interacting the VAM 
dummy with a poorly performing bidder dummy, defined as dummy variable = 1 if 
 
11 According to CSRC regulations, when a firm has consistently had three years of negative 
profits, this firm can then be delisted from the mainland stock market. 
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the acquirer’s pre-event ROA is smaller than the median value, otherwise = 0. The 
dependent variable given in Table 7 is the acquirer’s CAR (-1/1), and all other control 
variables are the same as those used in Table 4. The estimated coefficient for VAM 
remains positive. More importantly, the significantly positive coefficient on the 
interaction term VAM × poorly performing bidder suggests that the value creation 
effect of the VAM term is more pronounced when poorly performing acquirers adopt 
a VAM contract in a transaction. Taken together, the results provided in Table 7 
indicate that the value creation effects of a VAM are highly valued for this additional 
guarantee of performance improvements. An alternative definition/proxy of the poorly 
performing bidder dummy is discussed and examined in section 5.2 of this paper. 
 
4.4 Poorly performing bidder and operating performance 
In the following section, I explore the potential effects of a VAM on an 
acquirer’s operating performance, in order to explain why VAM contracts add value to 
poorly performing bidders’ shareholders.  
 𝑂𝑃𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑉𝐴𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽3𝑉𝐴𝑀 × 𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟 
+𝛾1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖      (3)         
The dependent variable is the industry median adjusted ROA & ROE one year 
following an acquisition, defined as the difference between raw data and the industry 
median value. I also calculate the change in operating performance one year before 
and one year after the acquisition as an alternative measure of operating performance. 
All regressions control for the acquiring firm’s characteristics and for deal 
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characteristics as defined in the Appendix. 
【Table 8】 
 
As illustrated in Table 8, the coefficient for the poorly performing bidder 
dummy is negative, suggesting that on average poorly performing bidders 
continuously have long-term lower operating performance compared to industry peers 
after an acquisition. However, when I examine the interaction term VAM × poorly 
performing bidder, the results show that the interaction terms become significantly 
positive, thereby suggesting that improvements in operating performance are more 
pronounced when poorly performing bidders adopt VAM contracts in transactions. 
These results are consistent with the CAR regression reported in Table 7. Taken 
together, the results provided in Tables 7 and 8 indicate that guaranteed performance 
improvements serve as an efficient way to enhance the operating performance of 
poorly performing acquirers and are highly valued by market participants.  
  By looking into the detail of each contract term, I further explore the source 
of improvements made in operating performance, and I examine the size of the VAM 
contract signed with targets, in order to explore why poorly performing acquirers 
benefit more from the VAM contract. 
𝑉𝐴𝑀 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝛾1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖    (4) 
The dependent variable is VAM Size, defined as net profits promised by targets 
(raw numbers) and net profits promised by targets scaled by the acquirer’s pre-event 
net profits. All regressions control for the acquiring firm’s characteristics and for the 





The coefficient for the poorly performing bidder dummy is significantly 
positive, thus suggesting that on average, poorly performing bidders signing a large 
VAM contract to guarantee improved operating performance. I also control for target 
pre-event performance (Target ROE) and Target size, the results for which indicate 
that VAM contract terms are not related to target quality. I add additional corporate 
governance variables into the regression, and these results show that the coefficients 
for the poorly performing bidder remain positive, thereby indicating that poorly 
performing acquirers greatly rely on large VAMs to improve operating performance.  
 
4.5 Poorly performing bidders and bid premium 
The results shown in Tables 7 and 8 indicate that VAMs are valuable to acquirers 
and especially to poorly performing acquirers in transactions; thus, a natural question 
to ask concerns whether a target firm might also benefit from signing a VAM contract 
with a bidder. In the following section, I examine whether a VAM can affect bid 
premiums, by running a multiple regression model, similar to that illustrated by 
equation 5. Since not every deal publicly discloses the bid premium, the following 
analyses are thus based on deals with available bid premium data. 
【Table 10】 
 
The results in Table 10 suggest that signing a VAM contract alone does not 
provide a significantly higher premium to target firms, because the “cash-out” 
channels for the shareholders (especially for firms held by private equities) of these 
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private target firms in China are either an IPO or an acquisition, and an IPO in China 
is a long process with lots of uncertainties. Therefore, a relatively easy option for 
private firm shareholders is acquisitions initiated by listed firms, thereby providing 
liquidity to target firms and enabling target shareholders to cash-out as soon as 
possible. Due to the “cash-out” and “liquidity” benefits for these private target firms, 
it is less likely we will observe a significantly higher premium paid to target 
shareholders. However, when I examine the interaction term VAM × poorly 
performing bidder, the results in column (1) of Table 10 show that it is significantly 
positive at the 5% level, thus indicating that acquirers tend to compensate targets with 
significantly higher premium when the latter sign a VAM contract with a poorly 
performing bidder. Column (2) of Table 10 focuses on the VAM sample only, and the 
regression results show that the bid premium is not determined by the target quality, 
since Target ROE is not test significant in the regression analyses. 
 
4.6 The likelihood of adopting a VAM contract 
 If adopting a VAM contract creates value for the shareholders of certain 
acquiring firms, do firms realise this gain and rationally choose to adopt such a 
contract? In this section, I investigate the determinants of acquiring firms’ decisions 
on adopting a VAM contract. I perform the following logit regression: 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑉𝐴𝑀)𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛾1𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝛾2𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,       (5) 
where the dependent variable 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑉𝐴𝑀)  is a dummy that equals one if the 
acquiring firm adopts a VAM, and zero otherwise. I include various firm and deal 
characteristics as the explanatory variables.  
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  Table 11 presents the results. The main variables of interest are the pre-holding 
dummy and the complex deal proxy. According to the information asymmetry 
hypothesis, acquiring firms should be more likely to adopt a VAM contract if they do 
not have a prior holding in a target firm (face severe information asymmetry) and in 
more complex transactions (defined as high relative deal size). The results confirm 
this prediction. The coefficient on the pre-holding dummy is significantly negative, 
suggesting that acquirers are more likely to adopt a VAM when they know less about 
a target firm. The coefficient on the complex deal dummy is significantly positive, 
implying that acquirers are more likely to adopt a VAM when deals are complex. 
【Table 11】 
5. Robustness Check 
5.1 Market-adjusted CAR and BHAR 
     Another concern in calculating abnormal returns used in the regression analysis 
is model specification bias, because the Chinese domestic market is less liquid 
compared with Western markets, and this illiquidity could bias the estimation of 
market model parameters (Dimson 1979; Dimson & Marsh 1983). To solve this 
problem, I use an alternative market-adjusted model to calculate CARs by re-running 
the baseline regression in Table 4. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 12 illustrate the results, 
using the market-adjusted model with the deal-level and corporate governance 
controlling variables, while fixed effects are controlled by year and industry dummies. 
The coefficients for the VAM dummy all remain significant and positive at the 1% 
level, thereby indicating that they do indeed create value for acquirers’ shareholders, 
even if I use different model and event periods. 
      I additionally calculate the buy and hold abnormal return in the post-event 12- 
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and 24-month periods. As show in Columns 3 & 4 of Table 12, the coefficient of the 
VAM term is not test significant, thus demonstrating that there are no return 
reversions following the short-term positive market reaction by adopting the VAM 




5.2 Alternative proxy of poorly performing acquirers 
      Throughout this paper, I have defined the poorly performing bidder by using 
ROA as a proxy of operating performance, while another robustness check involves 
using ROE as an alternative measure of operating performance, as it considers returns 
to equity holders and also takes out the impact of firms’ financing decisions (capital 
structure). All regressions in Table 13 are consistent with those reported in Table 8, 
indicating that the results are robust to different operating performance proxies.  
       My finial robustness check dummy the poorly performing bidder dummy as 
equalling 1 if an acquirer’s pre-event ROA is negative, and results using this 
alternative definition are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 8 and Table 




This study empirically analyses the relationship between VAM contracts and 
acquisitions in China. I find that acquisitions with VAM contract terms generate 
significantly higher value than those deals without a VAM, especially for poorly 
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performing acquirers. Further investigations regarding operating performance again 
document that the VAM can significantly increase poorly performing acquirers’ 
post-event operating performance and bidding premiums. Finally, I show that 
acquirers without pre-event holdings, and in complex deals, are more likely to adopt a 
VAM contract in the transaction. Collectively, this paper contributes to the 
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Table 1: Sample distribution by CSRC industry and year  
This table reports our sample distribution by acquirer industry and acquisition year. Our sample 
consists of 1023 M&A deals from GTA M&As databases, and industry classification follows CSRC 
industry code. 
          
Panel A All Samples VAM Samples 
CSRC Industry Classification N % N % 
Manufacturing 653 63.83% 149 66.22% 
IT 100 9.78% 45 20.00% 
Real estate 79 7.72% 2 0.89% 
Wholesale and retail trade 39 3.81% 2 0.89% 
Mining 31 3.03% 2 0.89% 
Transportation, storage 24 2.35% 0 0.00% 
Other communication and cultural industries 16 1.56% 2 0.89% 
Construction 16 1.56% 9 4.00% 
Agriculture, forestry, livestock farming, fishery 16 1.56% 6 2.67% 
Leasing and other business service 13 1.27% 3 1.33% 
Professional, scientific research service 13 1.27% 5 2.22% 
Public facilities service 12 1.17% 0 0.00% 
Catering and Hotels 6 0.59% 0 0.00% 
Comprehensive 4 0.39% 0 0.00% 
Hygiene, health care , nursing service and other social services 1 0.10% 0 0.00% 
Total 1023 100.00% 225 100.00% 
     
Panel B All Samples VAM Samples 
YEAR N % N % 
2009 58 5.67% 1 0.44% 
2010 97 9.48% 5 2.22% 
2011 135 13.20% 12 5.33% 
2012 192 18.77% 23 10.22% 
2013 239 23.36% 45 20.00% 
2014 302 29.52% 139 61.78% 







Table 2: Variables Summary Statistics 
This table reports the number, mean, standard deviations, 25th percentile, median, 75th percentile of 
acquirer and deal characteristics. See Appendix for the definition of variables. 
Variable N MEAN STD P25 P50 P75 
Cumulative Abnormal Return from Market Model    
CARmkt (-1,1) 1023 0.017  0.076  -0.026  0.007  0.049  
CARmkt (-2,2) 1023 0.019  0.094  -0.033  0.006  0.056  
Cumulative Abnormal Return Adjusted by Market Return    
CARmktadj(-1,1) 1023 0.027  0.078  -0.021  0.011  0.058  
CARmktadj(-2,2) 1023 0.031  0.098  -0.028  0.013  0.067  
Buy and Hold Abnormal Return (10-size reference portfolios)   
12 months 1023 0.020  0.532  -0.293  -0.067  0.246  
24 months 1023 0.036  0.772  -0.397  -0.099  0.312  
Operating Performance (one year post-event)     
Ind adj ROE 1023 0.008  0.050  -0.017  0.002  0.032  
Ind adj ROA 1023 0.005  0.084  -0.032  0.003  0.043  
ΔROA (-1Y/ 1Y) 1023 -0.008  0.062  -0.029  -0.008  0.012  
ΔROE (-1Y/ 1Y) 1023 -0.011  0.102  -0.040  -0.005  0.029  
Acquirer and Deal Characteristics      
Bid premium 651 10.878  50.760  1.378  2.500  5.162  
Size (in Billions) 1023 5.820  6.165  2.374  3.942  6.832  
Lev 1023 0.338  0.217  0.154  0.301  0.493  
Cash Holdings  1023 0.223  0.174  0.093  0.169  0.314  
Tobin’s Q 1023 2.060  1.169  1.317  1.654  2.298  
BM 1023 0.591  0.218  0.435  0.605  0.760  
Run-up 1023 0.081  0.471  -0.197  -0.011  0.256  
ROA 1023 0.017  0.053  -0.010  0.014  0.043  
ROE 1023 0.023  0.086  -0.016  0.015  0.058  
Pre-holdings (%) 1023 13.529  25.508  0.000  0.000  1.653  
Post-holdings (%) 1023 72.253  29.235  51.000  80.000  100.000  
Relative Size 1023 0.119  0.243  0.020  0.039  0.105  
All-cash (0/1) 1023 0.841  0.366  1.000  1.000  1.000  
Managerial Holdings 1023 0.171  0.227  0.000  0.013  0.362  
CEO Duality (0/1) 1023 0.338  0.473  0.000  0.000  1.000  
Independent Directors 1023 0.369  0.050  0.333  0.333  0.400  
Shareholding concentration (%) 1023 50.138  15.414  38.814  51.658  62.280  
Z Index 1023 8.796  17.333  1.669  3.618  7.789  
Sigma 1023 0.030  0.079  0.021  0.025  0.030  
VAM Contract Characteristics (VAM Sample only)    
VAM Size (million) 225 168.297  187.206  56.250  108.000  192.220  
Acq pre-event Net Profits (million) 225 84.300  115.000  21.800  55.500  111.000  
VAM Size/ Net Profits 225 3.134  9.807  0.486  1.415  3.842  
Target pre-event ROE 225 -4.543  196.830  8.824  13.015  18.026  
Target Size (million) 225 274.972  509.865  49.161  142.225  256.095  
Table 3: Univariate Tests of key variables 
This table reports acquirer and deal characteristics for VAM sample and the non-VAM sample, 





VAM Diff P-Value 
Cumulative Abnormal Return from Market Model  
CARmkt (-1,1) 0.007  0.065  -0.058  0.000  
CARmkt (-2,2) 0.006  0.074  -0.068  0.000  
Cumulative Abnormal Return Adjusted by Market Return  
CARmktadj(-1,1) 0.014  0.084  -0.070  0.000  
CARmktadj(-2,2) 0.015  0.099  -0.085  0.000  
Buy and Hold Abnormal Return (10-size reference portfolios) 
12 months 0.034  0.063  -0.029  0.559  
24 months 0.040  0.053  -0.012  0.862  
Operating Performance (one year post-event)   
Ind adj ROE 0.005  0.009  -0.003  0.399  
Ind adj ROA 0.000  0.009  -0.009  0.164  
ΔROA (-1Y/ 1Y) -0.015  0.000  -0.015  0.001  
ΔROE (-1Y/ 1Y) -0.021  0.000  -0.022  0.008  
Acquirer and Deal Characteristics    
Bid premium 9.582  10.257  -0.675  0.881  
Size (in Billions) 5.500  5.300  0.160  0.000  
Lev 0.336  0.298  0.038  0.026  
Cash Holdings  0.225  0.226  0.000  0.975  
Tobin’s Q 1.897  2.438  -0.541  0.000  
BM 0.638  0.502  0.136  0.000  
Run-up 0.061  0.272  -0.212  0.000  
ROA 0.017  0.012  0.006  0.176  
ROE 0.020  0.016  0.004  0.573  
Pre-holdings (%) 15.722  7.272  8.449  0.000  
Post-holdings (%) 72.165  81.964  -9.798  0.000  
Relative Size 0.076  0.308  -0.232  0.000  
All-cash (0/1) 0.953  0.377  0.576  0.000  
Managerial Holdings 0.175  0.245  -0.070  0.000  
CEO Duality (0/1) 0.380  0.367  0.013  0.743  
Independent Directors 0.371  0.370  0.001  0.733  
Shareholding concentration (%) 50.221  49.837  0.384  0.755  
Z Index 9.520  6.498  3.021  0.031  




Table 4: VAM and CAR 
This table presents results from the regression of acquirer CARs on the VAM dummy and other 
acquirer and deal-specific characteristics for a sample of China M&As. The dependent variable is 
acquirer CAR from market model. Variables are defined in Appendix. All regressions control for year 
and industry fixed effects. The p-values reported in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted 
for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level.  The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
  (1) (2) 
Dep.var = CARmkt(-1/1)  
VAM (0/1) 0.055*** 0.024*** 
 (0.000) (0.008) 
Size  -0.013*** 
  (0.000) 
Leverage  -0.007 
  (0.605) 
Cash Holding  -0.019 
  (0.291) 
Tobins' Q  -0.004 
  (0.205) 
BM  -0.030 
  (0.103) 
Run-up  0.013** 
  (0.030) 
ROA  0.013 
  (0.676) 
Pre-holdings  -0.004 
  (0.598) 
Post-holdings  0.001 
  (0.867) 
Relative Size  0.018* 
  (0.062) 
All-cash  -0.040*** 
  (0.001) 
Managerial Holdings  -0.005 
  (0.698) 
CEO Duality  -0.001 
  (0.881) 
Independent Directors  0.011 
 
 (0.791) 
Shareholding concentration (%)  0.028* 
  (0.054) 
Sigma  -0.185*** 
 
 (0.000) 
Intercepts 0.003 0.242*** 
  (0.833) (0.000) 
N 1023 1023 
R sqr 0.092 0.162 
Year Dummy Y Y 




Table 5: Addressing Endogeneity: Heckman Two-Stage Procedure for Acquirer 
CARs 
This table presents results of the Heckman two-stage procedure for acquirer CARs during M&A 
announcements. The first column reports the first-stage selection equation estimated by a Probit 
regression, where the dependent variable is one if the acquiring firm signed the VAM contract with 
target in the M&A process, and zero otherwise. The second column reports the second-stage regression, 
where the dependent variable is acquirer CAR and the inverse Mills ratio adjusted for potential self-
selection bias. Variables are defined in Appendix. The Scope variable equals one if the acquirers signed 
the VAM contract with private-equity investors before IPO, and zero otherwise. The p-values reported 
in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm 




  Selection 
Outcome 
(CARs) 
Scope 1.111***  
 (0.000)  
Size 0.041 -0.022* 
 (0.614) (0.056) 
Lev -0.543* 0.052 
 (0.089) (0.188) 
Cash Holdings -0.408 0.002 
 (0.284) (0.966) 
Tobin’s Q -0.094 0.007 
 (0.217) (0.458) 
BM -1.850*** 0.010 
 (0.000) (0.888) 
Run-up 0.125 0.029** 
 (0.280) (0.016) 
ROA -2.061** 0.077 
 (0.037) (0.526) 
Pre-holdings -0.400 0.001 
 (0.116) (0.964) 
Post-holdings -0.050 -0.037 
 (0.808) (0.190) 
Relative Size 0.037 -0.016 
 (0.826) (0.306) 
All-cash -1.495*** -0.016 
 (0.000) (0.667) 
Managerial Holdings 0.834*** 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.927) 
CEO Duality -0.058 -0.004 
 (0.619) (0.745) 
Independent Directors -1.148 0.017 
 (0.285) (0.896) 
Share Concentration Ratio 0.295 0.038 
 (0.442) (0.415) 
Sigma -1.390 -0.801 
 (0.516) (0.310) 
Inverse Mills Ratio  -0.029 
 
 (0.295) 
Intercept 1.421 0.454** 
 (0.304) (0.023) 
Observations 1023 1023 
First stage Pseudo R2 0.377 
Table 6: VAM and CAR, propensity score approach 
This table presents results from the propensity score matching approach. We build propensity score 
matching process using a logit model that estimates the usage of VAM contract in the acquisition, with 
dependent variable equal to one if VAM contract is present and zero otherwise. CAR is cumulative 




Panel A: Logistic Regression       
Variables Coefficients P-value   
Size (in Billions) 0.152 0.191   
Lev 0.933 0.041   
Cash Holdings  -0.504 0.347   
Tobin’s Q 0.117 0.268   
BM 3.043 0.000   
Run-up 0.628 0.000   
ROA 3.441 0.019   
Sigma 4.525 0.017   
Intercepts 3.531 0.059   
Pseudo R2 0.078   
N 1023   
     





(Treatment) Diff P value 
Size (in Billions) 15.105 15.223 -0.117 0.139 
Lev 0.280 0.310 -0.030 0.284 
Cash Holdings  0.253 0.226 0.027 0.138 
Tobin’s Q 2.585 2.498 0.087 0.637 
BM 0.496 0.502 -0.005 0.807 
Run-up 0.236 0.276 -0.039 0.528 
ROA 0.011 0.009 0.002 0.803 
sigma 0.027 0.029 -0.002 0.045 
     





(Treatment) Diff P value 
Cumulative Abnormal Return from Market Model  
CARmkt (-1,1) 0.027 0.065 -0.038 0.000 
CARmkt (-2,2) 0.027 0.074 -0.047 0.000 
Cumulative Abnormal Return Adjusted by Market Return  
CARmktadj(-1,1) 0.028 0.066 -0.038 0.000 
CARmktadj(-2,2) 0.031 0.079 -0.048 0.000 
     
Panel D: Rosenbaum bounds         
Rb: p-value of estimated difference at gamma=1  0.000 
Rb: critical value of Г at cut-off p=0.05   1.800 
Rb: critical value of Г at cut-off p=0.10     1.900 
 
 
Table 7: Poorly performing bidder, VAM and CARs 
This table presents results from the regression of acquirer CARs on the VAM dummy, its interaction 
with poorly performance bidders and other acquirer and deal-specific characteristics. The dependent 
variable is acquirer CAR(-1/1) from market model. Variables are defined in Appendix. All regressions 
control for year and industry fixed effects. The p-values reported in parentheses are based on standard 
errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. The symbols ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) 
Dep. var. = CARmkt(-1/1)     
VAM 0.023** 0.013 
 
(0.032) (0.262) 
Poorly performing bidders 0.006 -0.002 
 (0.361) (0.775) 
VAM × Poorly per bidder  0.036* 
 
 (0.054) 
Acquirer Controls Y Y 






Observations 1023 1023 















Table 8: Poorly performing bidder, VAM and post-event operating performance 
This table presents results from the regression of post-event operating performance on the VAM 
dummy, poorly performance bidders and other acquirer and deal-specific characteristics. The 
dependent variables are industry median adjusted ROA/ ROE 1 year after-event, and change of 
ROA/ROE 1 year before-event to 1 year after-event. Variables are defined in Appendix. The p-values 
reported in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the 
firm level. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
  Industry Adjusted Δ (-1Y/ 1Y) 
Dep. var. = Operating Performance ROA1Y ROE1Y ROA ROE 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VAM -0.011** -0.012 -0.007 -0.005 
 (0.021) (0.136) (0.197) (0.587) 
Poorly performing bidders -0.030*** -0.052*** 0.022*** 0.037*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
VAM × Poorly per bidder 0.015*** 0.026*** 0.019** 0.031** 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.012) (0.023) 
Size 0.013*** 0.022*** -0.001 0.009 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.725) (0.113) 
Leverage -0.001 0.054** 0.050*** -0.018 
 (0.934) (0.026) (0.002) (0.559) 
Cash Holding 0.038*** 0.034* 0.026* 0.041* 
 (0.002) (0.054) (0.091) (0.086) 
Tobins' Q 0.001 -0.001 0.005 0.008* 
 (0.695) (0.896) (0.155) (0.062) 
BM -0.023 -0.034 0.003 0.046 
 (0.162) (0.234) (0.876) (0.128) 
Run-up 0.002 0.002 0.008** 0.022* 
 (0.483) (0.704) (0.038) (0.056) 
Pre-holdings 0.003 0.007 0.008 0.032** 
 (0.632) (0.524) (0.299) (0.016) 
Post-holdings -0.007 -0.015* -0.011 -0.017 
 (0.197) (0.092) (0.192) (0.191) 
Relative Size 0.000 -0.007 0.012 -0.020 
 (0.999) (0.552) (0.138) (0.196) 
All-cash -0.012** -0.018** -0.007 -0.022** 
 (0.017) (0.023) (0.256) (0.011) 
Managerial Holdings 0.009 0.010 0.015* 0.024* 
 (0.165) (0.367) (0.057) (0.059) 
CEO Duality -0.007** -0.009 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.037) (0.152) (0.954) (0.980) 
Independent Directors -0.041 -0.060 -0.038 -0.036 
 (0.126) (0.217) (0.362) (0.603) 
Shareholding concentration (%) 0.035*** 0.069*** 0.005 0.031 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.659) (0.149) 
Sigma -0.021 -0.007 -0.053** -0.173** 
 (0.382) (0.862) (0.033) (0.036) 
Intercepts -0.173*** -0.327*** -0.030 -0.223** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.588) (0.027) 
N 1023 1023 1023 1023 
R sqr 0.232 0.184 0.176 0.095 
Year Dummy Y Y Y Y 




Table 9: Poorly performing bidder and size of VAM contract (VAM samples) 
This table presents results from the regression of size of VAM contract on the poorly-performing 
bidder and other acquirer and deal-specific characteristics (VAM Sample only). The dependent variable 
is size of VAM contract, measured by the total promised net profits by targets and total promised net 
profits by targets scaled by acquirers’ pre-event net profits. Variables are defined in Appendix. The p-
values reported in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered 
at the firm level. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 




VAM Size/ Net 
Profit 
Poorly performing bidders 0.213* 4.028*** 
 (0.092) (0.001) 
Size 0.356*** 0.191 
 (0.001) (0.907) 
Leverage -0.183 -9.118 
 (0.579) (0.108) 
Cash Holding -1.189*** -5.757 
 (0.003) (0.189) 
Tobins' Q -0.217* -0.749 
 (0.075) (0.606) 
BM -0.994 -6.427 
 (0.147) (0.415) 
Run-up 0.041 1.097 
 (0.617) (0.340) 
Pre-holdings 0.388 4.717 
 (0.299) (0.241) 
Post-holdings -0.789*** -3.962 
 (0.007) (0.292) 
Relative Size 0.696*** 1.840 
 (0.000) (0.650) 
All-cash -0.457*** 0.624 
 (0.004) (0.688) 
Managerial Holdings -0.323 1.127 
 (0.166) (0.641) 
CEO Duality 0.017 0.216 
 (0.873) (0.869) 
Independent Directors 1.135 3.057 
 (0.309) (0.807) 
Shareholding concentration  (%) -0.015 1.797 
 (0.967) (0.730) 
Target ROE 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.595) (0.426) 
Target Size 0.089*** 0.938** 
 (0.002) (0.029) 
Intercepts 4.482** 31.656 
  (0.019) (0.224) 
N 225 225 
R sqr 0.317 0.148 
Year Dummy Y Y 
Industry Dummy Y Y 
 
 
Table 10: Poorly performing bidder, VAM and bid premium 
This table presents results from the regression of bidding premium on the VAM dummy, its interaction 
with poorly-performing bidder and other acquirer and deal-specific characteristics. The dependent 
variable is bid premium. Variables are defined in Appendix. All regressions control for year and 
industry fixed effects. The p-values reported in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 





VAM (0/1) -5.037  
 (0.401)  
Poorly performing bidders -8.160* 11.942 
 (0.088) (0.249) 
VAM × Poorly per bidder 19.840**  
 (0.047)  
Size 7.176** 4.169 
 (0.023) (0.431) 
Leverage 3.269 -2.077 
 (0.580) (0.823) 
Cash Holding -13.876 -24.437 
 (0.267) (0.241) 
Tobin Q -3.502** -2.347 
 (0.035) (0.522) 
BM -8.480 -16.352 
 (0.523) (0.488) 
Run-up 4.709 2.273 
 (0.257) (0.584) 
Pre-holdings 11.897 -17.217 
 (0.431) (0.345) 
Post-holdings 11.597 25.899 
 (0.176) (0.339) 
Relative Size 6.847** 7.037 
 (0.020) (0.172) 
All-cash 8.783 22.566 
 (0.251) (0.298) 
Managerial Holdings 24.417 24.272 
 (0.102) (0.271) 
CEO Duality 1.468 -1.536 
 (0.756) (0.702) 
Independent Directors 2.059 -49.546 
 (0.963) (0.263) 
Shareholding concentration (%) 20.126* 24.812 
 (0.074) (0.304) 
Sigma -38.933 -58.116 
 (0.162) (0.824) 
Target Size  -1.467 
 
 (0.208) 
Target ROE  0.030 
 
 (0.746) 
Intercepts -107.314* -61.461 
  (0.055) (0.520) 
N 651 156 
R sqr 0.023 0.022 
Year Dummy Y Y 
Industry Dummy Y Y 
 
 
Table 11: Likelihood of adopting VAM in transaction  
This table presents results from the logit regression of the decision adopt VAM on acquirer and deal-
specific characteristics. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the acquiring 
firm adopts VAM and zero otherwise. Variables are defined in Appendix. The p-values are reported in 
parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Dep. var. = Prob(using VAM) (1) (2) (3) 
Pre-event Holding (0/1) -0.808***  -0.486** 
 (0.000)  (0.031) 
Complex deals  3.482*** 3.247*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Size -0.092 0.151 0.145 
 (0.450) (0.247) (0.268) 
Leverage -0.504 -0.956* -0.909* 
 (0.277) (0.060) (0.072) 
Cash Holding -0.997* -1.446** -1.489** 
 (0.081) (0.020) (0.016) 
Tobins' Q -0.108 -0.259** -0.233** 
 (0.291) (0.025) (0.041) 
BM -3.479*** -3.471*** -3.377*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Run-up 0.536*** 0.411** 0.407** 
 (0.001) (0.018) (0.018) 
ROA -3.409** -3.300** -3.365** 
 (0.021) (0.033) (0.030) 
Post-holdings 1.506*** 0.704** 0.837** 
 (0.000) (0.028) (0.011) 
Managerial Holdings 1.831*** 1.991*** 1.975*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO Duality -0.119 -0.015 -0.024 
 (0.500) (0.933) (0.898) 
Independent Directors -1.132 -2.289 -2.268 
 (0.481) (0.185) (0.188) 
Shareholding concentration (%) 0.318 0.078 0.055 
 (0.589) (0.899) (0.929) 
Sigma -4.711 -8.378 -8.609 
 (0.315) (0.273) (0.260) 
Intercepts 1.807 -0.765 -0.740 
 (0.393) (0.732) (0.742) 
Observations 1023 1023 1023 
Pseudo R2 0.137 0.196 0.200 
 
 
Table 12: Robustness Check - CAR (market adjusted model) and BHAR 
This table presents results from the regression of acquirer CARs & BHAR on the VAM dummy and 
other acquirer and deal-specific characteristics for a sample of China M&As. The dependent variable is 
acquirer CAR(-1,1) and CAR(-2/2) based on market index-adjusted model, and BHAR based on 10 
size-decile reference portfolios. Variables are defined in Appendix. All regressions control for year and 
industry fixed effects. The p-values reported in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Market Adjusted Model BHAR 
  CAR(-1/1) CAR(-2/2) 12M 24M 
VAM (0/1) 0.031*** 0.033*** -0.006 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.928) (0.997) 
Size -0.014*** -0.024*** -0.092*** -0.148*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.002 -0.004 0.052 -0.116 
 (0.884) (0.832) (0.589) (0.376) 
Cash Holding -0.004 -0.006 0.003 -0.159 
 (0.836) (0.805) (0.980) (0.361) 
Tobins' Q -0.006* -0.008* -0.048** 0.005 
 (0.073) (0.072) (0.026) (0.867) 
BM -0.047** -0.067*** -0.286** 0.089 
 (0.014) (0.007) (0.035) (0.663) 
Run-up 0.015*** 0.023*** -0.037 -0.114* 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.374) (0.067) 
ROA 0.022 0.054 -0.155 -0.088 
 (0.535) (0.297) (0.505) (0.825) 
Pre-holdings -0.007 -0.009 0.184** 0.206* 
 (0.385) (0.433) (0.017) (0.056) 
Post-holdings 0.004 0.006 -0.126** -0.263*** 
 (0.583) (0.562) (0.043) (0.008) 
Relative Size 0.022** 0.034** -0.024 -0.172*** 
 (0.029) (0.020) (0.632) (0.006) 
All-cash -0.044*** -0.056*** -0.071 -0.062 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.360) (0.528) 
Managerial Holdings -0.009 -0.016 0.009 0.112 
 (0.422) (0.282) (0.919) (0.404) 
CEO Duality 0.001 -0.000 0.017 -0.017 
 (0.796) (0.996) (0.659) (0.749) 
Independent Directors 0.015 -0.002 -0.524 -0.040 
 (0.715) (0.974) (0.114) (0.939) 
Shareholding concentration (%) 0.032** 0.031 0.385*** 0.690*** 
 (0.031) (0.102) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sigma -0.083*** -0.093** 0.455 0.936** 
 (0.010) (0.025) (0.111) (0.029) 
Intercepts 0.266*** 0.463*** 1.869*** 1.873*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
N 1023 1023 1023 1023 
R sqr 0.201 0.219 0.040 0.062 
Year Dummy Y Y Y Y 
Industry Dummy Y Y Y Y 
 
 
Table 13: Robustness check – alternative measure of pre-event performance 
This table presents results from the regression of post-event operating performance on the VAM 
dummy, poorly performance bidders (ROE) and other acquirer and deal-specific characteristics. The 
dependent variables are industry median adjusted ROA/ ROE 1 year after-events, and change of 
ROA/ROE 1 year before-event to 1 year after-event. Variables are defined in Appendix. The p-values 
reported in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the 
firm level. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
  Industry Adjusted Δ (-1Y/ 1Y) 
Dep. var. = Operating Performance ROA1Y ROE1Y ROA ROE 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VAM -0.010* -0.011 -0.005 -0.001 
 (0.051) (0.180) (0.358) (0.888) 
Poorly performing bidders (ROE) -0.027*** -0.050*** 0.023*** 0.038*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
VAM × Poorly per bidder (ROE) 0.011* 0.024** 0.016** 0.025* 
 (0.051) (0.014) (0.034) (0.070) 
Acquirer controls Y Y Y Y 
Deal Controls  Y Y Y Y 
Intercepts -0.174*** -0.340*** -0.033 -0.232** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.555) (0.022) 
N -0.166*** -0.307*** -0.046 -0.247** 
R sqr (0.000) (0.000) (0.414) (0.010) 
Year Dummy 1023 1023 1023 1023 













Appendix: Variable Definition 
Variables Definitions 
CARMktadj(-1,1) 
Cumulative abnormal return adjusted by the market return during the event 
window (-1,1) 
CARMktadj(-2,2) 
Cumulative abnormal return adjusted by the market return during the event 
window (-2,2) 
CARMkt(-1,1) 
Cumulative abnormal return calculated from the market model during the 
event window (-1,1) 
CARMkt(-2,2) 
Cumulative abnormal return calculated from the market model during the 
event window (-2,2) 
BHAR Buy and hold abnormal return based on 10-size reference portfolio 
Ind adj ROE1Y Industry median adjusted ROE 1 year after-events 
Ind adj ROA1Y Industry median adjusted ROA 1 year after-events 
ΔROA (-1Y/ 1Y) Change of ROA 1 year before-event to 1 year after-event 
ΔROE (-1Y/ 1Y) Change of ROE 1 year before-event to 1 year after-event 
VAM (0/1) 
Dummy variable = 1 if acquiring firms adopt VAM term in the transaction, 
otherwise = 0. 
Bid Premium Transaction value paid/ Target book value 
Size (in billions) 
Acquire market capitalization (in Billions) at year end prior to acquisition 
announcements 
Lev 
Acquirer leverage ratio, defined as total liability scaled by total assets, at 
year end prior to acquisition announcements 
Cash holdings 
Acquirer cash-to-total assets ratio at year end prior to acquisition 
announcements 
Tobin’s Q Acquirer Tobin’s Q at year end prior to acquisition announcements 
BM 
Acquirer book-to-market equity ratio at year end prior to acquisition 
announcements 
Run-up 
Acquirer 12-month buy and hold abnormal return prior to acquisition 
announcements 
ROA/ROE 
Acquirer end of year return-on-asset/ return-on-equity prior to acquisition 
announcements 
Pre-holdings Percentage shares of target firm held by acquirers before acquisitions 
Post-holdings Percentage shares of target firm held by acquirer after acquisitions 
Relative Size 
Deal transaction value scaled by acquirer total assets prior to acquisition 
announcements 
All-cash (0/1) 
A dummy variable that equals one when payment is 100% cash and zero 
otherwise 
Managerial holdings 
Percentage shares of target firm held by managerial team of acquirers prior 
to acquisition announcements 
CEO Duality (0/1) 
A dummy variable that equals one if CEO and Chairman are the same 
person and zero otherwise 
Independent directors Percentage of independent directors on the board of directors 
Shareholding 
concentration % 
Percentage shares hold by controlling shareholders 
VAM Size The total promised net profits by targets in VAM contract 
Acq. pre-event net profits Acquirer net profits at year end prior to acquisition announcements 
VAM Size/ Net Profits 
Total promised net profits by targets scaled by acquirers’ pre-event net 
profits 
Complex deal High relative size.  
Scope 
Dummy equals to one when an acquirer once signed a VAM contract with 
private-equity investors before being listed in the stock market and a value 
of zero otherwise 
Poorly performing bidder 
(ROA) 
Dummy variable =1 if acquirer’s pre-event ROA is smaller than the median 
value of all acquirers, otherwise =0. 
Poorly performing bidder 
(ROE) 
Dummy variable =1 if acquirer’s pre-event ROE is smaller than the median 
value of all acquirers, otherwise =0. 
Sigma 
The standard deviation of the residuals from the market model that is 
estimated from t-250 days before M&A announcement to t-40. T0 is the 
M&A announcement day. 
Target ROE Target end of year return-on-equity prior to acquisition announcements 
Target Size Target book value at year end prior to acquisition announcements 
 
